A number of existing risk assessment tools make reference to, or incorporate, a Multiple Barrier Approach to drinking water safety. Three waterborne disease outbreaks that occurred in developed nations were used as case studies to test a selected set of risk assessment tools.
INTRODUCTION
Based on testimony given and evidence submitted to the Walkerton Inquiry, it became clear that the outbreak was caused by the concurrent failure of a number of the ''barriers'' that are relied upon to prevent contamination of drinking water and protect public health (Hrudey & Hrudey 2002) . As a result, Justice Dennis O'Connor concluded that reliance upon a Multiple Barrier Approach (MBA) represents ''the best way to achieve a healthy public water supply'' (O'Connor 2002b) . The five types of barriers were summarized as follows by Hrudey & Hrudey (2002) :
Source protection measures to maintain raw water quality and reduce the risk of contamination entering the water system; treatment processes to remove or inactivate contaminants;
distribution system security to prevent the contamination of treated water and maintenance of a disinfection residual to ensure delivery of safe water to consumers; monitoring activities to control treatment processes and detect contamination; and response activities to address adverse water quality or system failure.
The Walkerton outbreak was not unique, in the sense that historical waterborne disease outbreaks have generally been caused by the failure of more than one water system barrier (O'Connor 2002b; Hrudey & Hrudey 2007) . Due to the increasing awareness of the failure potential which may exist in the water supply systems in developed countries, a substantial number of jurisdictions and non-governmental organizations have developed risk assessment and management guidance documents or tools that incorporate the MBA to some extent. This list includes the Australian Drinking A number of these tools have incorporated qualitative or semi-quantitative risk assessment procedures in order to identify potential hazards to drinking water safety. The qualitative risk assessment process is often based on the user assigning likelihood and consequence scores to each of the hazards that he or she has identified. Risk assessment is an inherently subjective process, so the output for a given risk assessment process will vary between users for a given water system (Ministry of the Environment 2007). One of the weaknesses in some of the aforementioned risk assessment tools is that they rely on the user to identify all of the potential hazards associated with a drinking water system, which further adds to the subjectivity of the process. As a result, the output from the qualitative risk assessment process may vary significantly depending on the expertise of the user and his/her level of familiarity and objectivity with the drinking water system, and the degree to which they consider the MBA concept.
Historic outbreaks provide information regarding potential sources of microbial contamination, and demonstrate the importance of the events or conditions that contributed to the failure of the water system barriers (Deere et al. 2001) . This paper uses a number of documented waterborne disease outbreaks that occurred in developed countries as case studies. These three outbreaks were selected because each case involves the contamination entering the water system at a different point either prior to, during, or after water treatment.
As a result, these case studies will be used to test the ability of a set of risk assessment tools to identify hazards and vulnerabilities associated with individual barriers to contamination, and the degree to which the tools represent and incorporate the interdependence of the barriers. The conditions of the respective water systems at the time of the waterborne disease outbreaks have been documented in journal articles that were published in the wake of the outbreaks. The input to the risk assessment tools will be based on the condition of the water system immediately prior to the contamination event that led to the outbreak (i.e. as if an individual was completing the application of a particular tool just before contamination entered the water system).
For the purpose of this paper, the British Columbia Screening Tool, the assessment team would identify the hazards and vulnerabilities for that barrier when completing the module. If, for some reason, the DWO could not identify a potential hazard or vulnerability based on the input to the B. C. Screening Tool, then it is less likely that the DWO would order the supplier to complete the module that is relevant to that hazard or vulnerability. As a result, the risk assessment team would be less likely to identify that hazard or vulnerability when completing the required modules, which would severely limit the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Assessment process. Thus, the ability of the B. C. Screening Tool to identify hazards and vulnerabilities was used to determine whether the factors that led to the respective waterborne disease outbreaks would be identified in the Comprehensive Assessment process.
MRA Tool
The MRA Tool was developed as a self-assessment tool for use by small water system personnel (Butterfield & Camper 2004) . There is no regulatory involvement in completing the assessment or interpreting the output of the MRA Tool.
The MRA Tool is available as a Microsoft s Excel spreadsheet. The MRA Tool is organized as a series of surveys, with each survey addressing a barrier of the water system. Each survey has a separate worksheet where the user inputs answers to the individual survey questions. Based on user input, each survey question receives a numerical score in the range of 0 to 1, where a score of 1 represents the greatest potential for microbial contamination (Butterfield & Camper 2004) . Each survey question was assigned a weighting based on the relative importance of that question compared to the other questions in the survey, such that the sum of weights for a given survey is equal to one. The weightings are based on expert opinion, and cannot be viewed or modified by the user.
Ranked pairwise comparison was employed to convert expert opinion regarding the relative importance of the questions in a given survey to numerical weights (Butterfield & Camper 2004) .
The score of 0 to 1 assigned to each survey question is multiplied by the weighting for that question to calculate the weighted score for each survey question. The weighted scores for the individual questions are then summed to calculate the total score for the survey. If there are multiple facilities (i.e. multiple wells or storage tanks) for a given barrier, the survey is completed separately for each facility, and the MRA Tool assigns a weighting to the input for each facility based on the fraction of the water system capacity that each facility represent (Butterfield & Camper 2004) . The total score for each survey is then multiplied by its respective weight, and the weighted survey scores are summed to calculate a total water system score in the range of 0 to 1.
The MRA Tool output includes comments regarding individual survey questions that receive elevated scores. In addition, the scores assigned to the individual survey questions and the contribution of each survey to the total score for the water system can be viewed in both graphical and tabular form (Butterfield & Camper 2004) , which helps illustrate the water system barriers that are calculated to be at the greatest risk of microbial contamination.
PWS Tool
The Private Water Supplies (Scotland) Regulation 2006 states that, the local health authority must complete a risk assessment of a private water supply prior to the supply being used if it is new or has been out of service for a period of greater than one year, or if the local authority believes that the water supply is no longer wholesome. This applies to all ''Type A'' supplies, which serve greater than 50 persons, provide greater than ten cubic metres of water per day, or supply water for a commercial or public activity (The Scottish Ministers 2006) . Executive 2006) . Both the WHO Guidelines for drinking-water quality and the Private water supplies technical manual make reference to the MBA. The WHO states that a Water Safety Plan (WSP) represents ''the most effective means of consistently ensuring the safety of a drinking water supply y through the use of a comprehensive risk assessment and risk management approach that encompasses all steps in water supply from catchment to consumer'' (WHO 2006) . The risk assessment forms included in the PWS Tool are considered to be the first stage in the development of WSPs for private water supplies in Scotland (Scottish Executive 2006) .
Plans (Scottish
There are four risk assessment forms; each addresses a different type of water supply: boreholes (drilled wells), springs, surface water supplies, and wells (dug wells). Since all of the case studies used in this paper received their water supply from drilled wells, only the one form was used for this paper. However, it should be noted that the four surveys have a similar structure, scoring system, and many common survey questions, so the output from the borehole risk assessment form is representative of the output from the other three forms. The ''front end'' of each form collects contact information for the water system, recent monitoring results, historical regulatory involvement, and water system documentation.
The risk assessment section of each form is divided into surveys, including the general site survey and supply survey.
The spring and well risk assessment forms also have a soil leaching risk survey. In the general site survey and supply survey, each question is assigned a risk characterization score of high, medium, or low, which is pre-selected on the form based on the presence or absence of a hazard or vulnerability. If a ''high'' risk characterization score is assigned based on the user input, the user must also calculate a hazard assessment score for the survey question. The semiquantitative hazard assessment score is calculated by multiplying the pre-selected consequence score for the survey question by a likelihood score selected by the user. Both the consequence and likelihood scores use the same non-ordinal scale of one to sixteen. It should be noted that the hazard assessment score does not have any implied mathematical relationship to risk, but is used to prioritize the aspects of the water system that require corrective action (Scottish Executive 2006) . Upon completion of the surveys, the highest risk characterization score assigned to a survey question is taken as the risk characterization score for that survey. The risk characterization score for the source survey is recorded as the overall risk assessment score for the water system (Scottish Executive 2006).
CASE STUDIES Walkerton, Ontario
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During the Walkerton Inquiry, manure storage and application activities at a farm located near Well No. 5 were identified as the primary source of microbial contamination The local public health office was notified of an apparent outbreak of acute gastroenteritis on May 9, 1983, and collected water samples from the distribution system to investigate. The analytical results received on May 11 showed that all four samples were positive for total coliform bacteria.
A Boil Water Notice was issued that day as a result (Hrudey & Hrudey 2004) . 
Gideon, Missouri
At the time of the outbreak, the Gideon water system was supplied with water by two adjacent wells, Wells No. 5 and No. 6, which alternated as the water supply well on a monthly basis. The wells were artesian, and were completed at a depth of approximately 390 m (Angulo et al. 1997) . The supply aquifer was considered to be secure due to geologic isolation (Hrudey & Hrudey 2004) . As a result, the water supply was distributed without treatment. The municipal water system was constructed in the 1930s (Clark et al. 1996a) . Two large municipal water towers, which will be referred to as T200 and T300, were connected to the distribution system. T200 and T300 had capacities of 190 and 380 cubic metres (m 3 ) respectively. Precipitation and vermin could potentially enter T300 due to a poorly constructed vent and an uncovered access hatch (Angulo et al. 1997) . A large
In response to taste and odour complaints, the municipality performed distribution system flushing activities on
November 10, 1993 that included sequential flushing of all 50 fire hydrants connected to the distribution system for a period of 15 minutes each (Clark et al. 1996a as well as fecal and total coliform bacteria (Clark et al. 1996a ).
Due to the vulnerabilities in the construction of the water towers, the outbreak investigation focused on the storage facilities. Birds were observed roosting on the roof of T300, and bird feathers were observed floating on the surface of the stored water during the field investigation performed after the outbreak (Angulo et al. 1997) . The circumstantial explanation for the contamination entering the Gideon distribution system is that the cold temperatures on November 9 caused a thermal inversion in T300, which allowed contamination near the water surface to mix with the bulk storage volume and enter the distribution system. The contamination resulted in the taste and odour complaints (Hrudey & Hrudey 2004) .
Distribution system modelling of the flushing program showed that the high school, the fire hydrant where the sample that was positive for S. typhimurium was collected, and a number of the residences where people with confirmed cases of salmonellosis lived were located in area that was supplied with water from T300 during the first 6 hours of the flushing program (Clark et al. 1996a) . As a result, T300 was identified as the point of entry for the contamination that led to the waterborne disease outbreak.
For the period of November 11 to December 27, 1993, approximately 600 residents and visitors to Gideon experi-enced cases of gastroenteritis, including seven nursing home residents who died (Clark et al. 1996b ).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Failure of the source protection barrier
Since the Walkerton outbreak is the only case study considered in this paper that involved contamination of the water source, it is the only case that will be used to determine how well the selected risk assessment tools incorporate the source water protection barrier.
Due to the fact that it pumped water from a shallow 
Failure of the treatment barrier

Walkerton case study
As mentioned previously, each of the wells supplying the Walkerton water system was outfitted with a separate chlorination system to achieve primary disinfection prior to the treated water reaching the first user. 
Greenville case study
Based on the input to the B. C. Screening Tool regarding the treatment equipment serving the Greenville water system, the treatment system appears to be suitable for a groundwater source. In addition to the survey questions regarding the specific treatment processes that are in use, the B. C.
Screening Tool includes a question regarding the security of water system infrastructure with respect to tampering and For the purpose of the MRA Tool treatment survey, the aeration-settling tank was assumed to be best described as a shallow aeration basin. Air would enter the tank by passing through the screen on top of the tank, but would not undergo any filtration or disinfection prior to coming into contact with the water. The MRA Tool correctly identifies the vulnerability associated with allowing untreated atmospheric air to come into contact with water. As a result, the MRA Tool also successfully identifies and assigns a relatively high risk score to a survey question addressing the vulnerability in the treatment system that led to the contamination of the treated water.
Failure of distribution and storage barrier
Gideon case study Since there were two municipal storage tanks, the storage survey for the MRA Tool is completed for each tank separately.
The total weighted score for the survey question is then calculated based on the scores assigned to each storage tank for that question, and the contribution that each storage tank makes to the total storage capacity for the water system. respectively, for T300. However, since there are no records of holes in the roof or poor vent construction for T200, these questions received risk scores of zero for T200. As a result, the contribution that the physical vulnerabilities of T300 make to the total weighted risk score for the storage survey is reduced due to the relatively good condition of T200.
Based on the condition of the system immediately prior to the contamination event that led to the outbreak, a total score of 0.608 was assigned to the Gideon water system.
The total weighted score for the storage survey is 0.104, which represents 17 percent of the total system score. Even if T300 had been the only municipal storage tank in use at the time, the total weighted score for the storage survey would increase only slightly to 0.116, which would be 19% of the total system score of 0.620. The contamination that caused the outbreak entered the Gideon water system through the storage tank T300, but the total weighted score for the storage survey does not properly represent the degree to which the vulnerability of this infrastructure influenced the microbial risk to the water system. This is largely due to the relatively low weighting assigned to the storage survey by the experts who completed the pairwise comparison. Despite the fact that the MRA Tool storage survey includes questions that identify the vulnerabilities in the storage infrastructure and operation of that infrastructure that allowed contamination to accumulate in T300, these vulnerabilities may not be considered a high priority for the implementation of preventative measures or corrective actions due to the relatively small contribution they make to the total water system score.
In hierarchical assessment tools such as the MRA Tool, the phenomenon where the high risk scores assigned to a number of survey questions are not reflected in the aggregated score for the assessment tool is referred to as eclipsing (Sadiq et al. 2004 ). The aggregated score may be sensitive to the aggregation operator used to combine the scores assigned to individual survey question, or the weights assigned to those survey questions. During the development of hierarchical assessment tools, sensitivity analyses can be used to determine the impact that changes in the aggregation operator or weighting have on the output of the assessment tool (Sadiq et al. 2004) .
Ideally, a risk assessment tool should be designed such that it maintains the high risk scores assigned to components of the water system that only receive a fraction of the system flow, or are used on an intermittent or rare basis. A vulnerability that is present in one component of a system can lead to the failure of the entire system (McBean & Rovers 1998) .
and treated water monitoring in addition to monitoring water quality in the distribution system. As a result, these case studies will be used to determine whether the different tools detect deficiencies in monitoring activities at the source, during treatment, and in the distribution system. 
Walkerton case study
Failure of the response barrier
There is far better documentation regarding the response on the part of the Walkerton PUC and the relevant governmental agencies during the Walkerton outbreak than there is for the other outbreaks discussed herein. As a result, the Walkerton outbreak will be used to determine how well the selected risk assessment tools incorporate the response barrier.
As stated earlier, the laboratory notified the Walkerton The DWQMS recommends that these procedures be reviewed and updated on an annual basis, and that the review process be documented (MOE 2007) . These review documents can then be made available to internal and external auditors, in addition to the emergency response procedures themselves.
Regular, documented internal reviews and testing of emergency response procedures could allow an auditor or inspector to assess the suitability of procedures and documentation that represent the response barrier for a water system in a relatively short period of time compared to the inspector completing an individual review of each document.
CONCLUSIONS
The three case studies evaluated in this research, which represent drinking water outbreaks that occurred due to contamination of the water supply at different points from the source to the tap, illustrate the issues associated with incorporating the Multiple Barrier Approach. Calculating qualitative or semi-quantitative risk scores for a water system provides easily interpreted output that shows the user the components of the water system that are most in need of corrective action. However, if these risk scores are aggregated in a hierarchical assessment tool in order to calculate a total risk score for an individual barrier or for the water system as a whole, the total risk score must be calculated in such a way that a high risk score assigned to a specific question or barrier is not diluted or eclipsed by relatively low risk scores assigned to other survey questions or barriers. The questions included in the MRA Tool storage survey identified the vulnerabilities in the construction and current condition of the T300 municipal water storage tank that led to the outbreak in Gideon, Mo. However, the contribution that these vulnerabilities made to the total score for the storage barrier was reduced due to the relatively good condition of the T200 water storage tank, and the contribution of the storage survey to the total risk score for the water system was limited by the relatively low weighting assigned to the storage survey. The PWS risk assessment tool avoids the problem of eclipsing by not assigning weights to individual survey questions. Instead, the highest risk characterization score assigned to a survey question is selected as the score for that survey. While this strategy prevents the risk associated with a water system from being understated due to eclipsing, it may lead to the risk being overstated in some cases. Future risk assessment tools will need to use aggregation operators and methods of assigning weights to individual survey questions that balance the issues of eclipsing and overstating.
In general, the selected risk assessment tools identified hazards and vulnerabilities associated with the water system Journal of Water and Health 9 9 9 9 09.2 9 9 9 9 2011 infrastructure that provide barriers to contamination, but did not focus on the response barrier. Water system owners and operators should not wait until water quality issues occur to test their corrective action and emergency response procedures. Thoroughly documented desktop and field exercises can help ensure that the existing procedures are suitable and can be implemented by water system personnel. In addition, the records from these exercises could be evaluated by the regulatory authority or a third party as part of the risk assessment for the water system, in order to allow for the response barrier to be assessed without an outbreak occurring.
During the development of new risk assessment tools, historic waterborne disease outbreaks can be used as desktop case studies to ensure that the tools incorporate the MBA and address the shortcomings of the existing tools. In addition, field verification testing will be necessary to ensure that the risk assessment tool remains user friendly, and can typically be completed based on observations and documentation that are typically available during the inspection of a small drinking water system.
